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IntroductIon
Vladimir Putin serVed on the front lines during the Cold War as a KGB agent in Dresden, helping to defend the Soviet-communist order. 1 As the Party was ending, Putin had a front row seat to the collapse of communism and Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Despite the presence of overwhelming military superiority, he saw firsthand how useless all the Soviet weaponry had become without backing of political will. The Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev had apparently lost faith in the communist ideal, and when protests broke out against the ruling regime in East Germany, and Putin turned to Moscow for guidance, the response was silence. 2 Some of the Kremlin's reticence stemmed from the conviction that their political and economic systems needed to be reformed. Using military force to crush popular protests did not align with Gorbachev's and the party leadership's "new thinking."
3 Protests against the old order continued to spread, and it was not long before the new Russian leadership under Boris Yeltsin renounced communism and pledged to adopt an ideology more aligned with Western forms of democracy and a market economy. These pledges, however, became largely discredited in Russia during the 1990s, as the political system veered toward authoritarianism and where much of the national economy was pilfered. With regard to a new ideology, the Kremlin remained adrift.
Before Putin became president, he had completed a dissertation built around the thesis that to modernize the Russian economy and improve the general well-being of the population, the country's leadership needed to gain greater control over key sectors of the Russian economy. Revenues from the sale of natural resources could help "in building up the economy, providing revenue and jobs, and promoting economic integration within Russia, with the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and with the world economy." 4 As the Cold War had just recently ended and country's leadership was still looking for closer cooperation with the West, there was no specific mention in Putin's dissertation of harnessing this wealth to rebuild Russia's military forces.
During his first two terms as president (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , Putin did more than just pay lip service to his dissertation's thesis. Higher fossil fuel prices helped Putin and his associates amass huge fortunes while incomes and the standard of living improved for most Russians. The Russian economy grew at an impressive rate, pensions were paid on time and a portion of the country's resource wealth was spent on capital improvements (e.g., healthcare, roads, education, etc.). Although not dramatic, there were also steady improvements within Russia's Armed Forces.
Concomitant with this improvement in living conditions were increasing signs that Russia did not accept a post-Cold War, Washington-led global order. A new Kremlin-supported ideology began to emerge under Putin, which claimed that Russia remained a great power and enjoyed a certain sphere of influence. The ideology asserted that a multipolar global order (where Russia serves as a pole) was more stable than a unipolar version. The emergence of this ideology coincided with increasing domestic political repression. As relations with the West became more strained, the Kremlin leadership began to place greater emphasis on strengthening its regional and global presence through Russian military power.
A key component of the Kremlin's new ideology has been its rewriting of the narrative surrounding the collapse of the USSR. Instead of seeing the fall of the Soviet Union as a result of a failed political and economic model, the Kremlin now emphasizes the nefarious role that the West (and the U.S. in particular) played in its demise. In their rendition, the West conspired to bring down the USSR, and then continued to humiliate and exploit Russia during the painful decade of the 1990s. This sense of humiliation and resentment toward the U.S. forms the nucleus of the Kremlin's chronicle of recent history. Current Kremlin propaganda is built around the need to defend Russia from this same Western threat, serving as justification for a more assertive foreign policy.
Since his return as Russian president in May 2012, Putin has made military modernization a top priority. Strengthening the Russian military has become the key component in the larger Kremlin strategy of building a multi-polar global order, where Russia serves as an opposing pole to the West, and in particular to the United States. However, Putin clearly remembers the utility of military hardware in East Germany as the Soviet system began to collapse. He understands that alongside raw military power, the country needs a strong ideology around which the Russian people can rally. The Kremlin has harnessed the country's national media, where, for the past several years, the U.S./West has been transformed from partner into predator, and where patriotism is defined as military prowess. In the new Kremlin narrative, to defend against this threat, Russia needs a strong leader and formidable military. This essay will examine the geopolitical background to the Russian military's evolution under Putin, Putin's own evolution as a military leader, the military's current status, and some possible future implications from Russia's growing military strength.
PutIn's EvolvIng vIEw toward thE russIan MIlItary
As in other aspects of his role as Russian leader, Putin's views toward the military have evolved over the past seventeen years. When he was appointed as prime minister (and possible successor to Yeltsin) in August 1999, he inherited a military that was in disarray. The decade following the collapse of the USSR had largely been an unmitigated tragedy for those serving in the military. After the humiliating retreat of Soviet/Russian forces from Eastern Europe and most of the republics of the former USSR, Russian military personnel confronted near economic collapse at home and a general disregard for their welfare. The catalog of grievances and problems was long: corruption flourished while many officers went months without being paid; decent housing was in short supply; draft dodging was rampant while criminality within the ranks increased; equipment maintenance deteriorated, and research-development funding was slashed.
These weaknesses manifested when Russian military forces were tasked to crush the separatist revolt in Chechnya in late 1994. Over the next twenty months of vicious fighting, Russian military forces displayed low morale and poor counterinsurgency skills. 5 These weaknesses were aggravated by a lack of effective command and control (C2) and a casual disregard for the loss of human life-whether enemy, civilian non-combatants, or their own soldiers.
6 When a ceasefire agreement was signed in August 1996, many Russian senior military personnel again felt humiliated and betrayed. They would later claim that military operations had been hampered by short-term political constraints (e.g., the re-election of Yeltsin in May 1996) and high-level corruption. There was a growing divide between the Kremlin and Russia's disaffected military leadership. President Yeltsin's declining physical health from 1997-99 was an apt metaphor for the general deterioration of the country and the military. Despite an influx of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt in late summer 1998, crashing the ruble and the country's banking system. Russia's economic uncertainty coincided with even greater political ambiguity as the Kremlin cycled through a number of possible Yeltsin replacements. 7 The country appeared to be heading toward disaster.
Against this background of almost total economic and political paralysis, the U.S. and other NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries began offensive military operations (without a U.N. resolution) against Serbia in March 1999. The argument that Western forces were responding to Serbian aggression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo carried little weight in Moscow. Russian leaders bemoaned this unilateral use of air power against their Serb-Orthodox brothers. The Kosovo conflict proved to be a watershed in Russia's later foreign and military policy, demonstrating to the Kremlin leadership that Russian concerns would only be heeded if backed by strong and combat-ready military forces.
8 Russian political and military leaders began to coalesce around the idea of reclaiming their global status by rebuilding the military.
The troubled Kremlin leadership was also concerned with the deteriorating conditions around Chechnya and the North Caucasus. The 1996 Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement had left Chechnya with an ill-defined political status, allowing the war-torn province to devolve into banditry and religious extremism. 9 This chaos began to spread to adjacent regions in the summer of 1999.
Thus, when Putin was appointed prime minister in August 1999, he confronted both significant domestic and international challenges. He began by promising to crush the Chechen insurgency in the North Caucasus. His tough rhetoric raised his profile to national (and electable) prominence. 10 In order to accomplish this, he had to fortify the decrepit Russian conventional Armed Forces. By cobbling together combat-ready units from around the country from all of Russia's various security agencies (e.g. military, internal forces, emergency forces, etc.), he was able to assemble sufficient forces to stop the Chechen incursion into neighboring Dagestan. Putin also relied heavily upon local defense forces in Dagestan.
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After defeating this incursion, the Kremlin went on to establish its mandate throughout all of Chechnya. During this stage of the Chechen conflict, Putin gained respect among many military leaders by often supporting and defending their brutal strategy. Russian military forces enjoyed a distinct advantage in sheer firepower, employing massive artillery and air bombardment to flush out the separatists. Putin combined this mailed-fist strategy with an equally aggressive counterinsurgency effort, successfully co-opting important elements of the Chechen leadership.
Putin was elected as Russia's president in March 2000 and had been in office less than six months when the nuclear submarine Kursk exploded and sank in the Barents Sea with a total loss of crew. This tragedy revealed to Putin not only the dire straits of Russia's strategic deterrent, but also mendacity among some within the military's chain of command. It certainly also impressed upon the Russian leader the dangerous fallout from negative media coverage. This incident provided additional impetus for the Kremlin's consolidation and control over the country's major media, which, in turn, became an important tool in gaining and maintaining domestic support. 13 After the attacks on 9-11, Putin expressed both condolences and a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in the fight against Islamic extremism. Although some Russian military leaders complained, Putin allowed open access to the American military into Russia's Central Asian backyard.
14 These goodwill gestures toward greater security cooperation were seemingly rejected three months later when the U.S. unilaterally pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. From the Kremlin's perspective, this treaty abrogation was indicative of Washington's ingratitude and signaled the determination of American military leaders to pursue global military dominance by neutralizing Russia's strategic nuclear retaliatory capability. The Kremlin reacted by pursuing the development of adequate nuclear countermeasures which included the development and modernization of their own nuclear arsenal.
The Kremlin's concern that the U.S. was intent upon becoming the indispensable global hegemon was further confirmed during the run-up and initial stage of the Iraq conflict in early 2003. Russian officials argued that in employing armed force against Iraq, Washington would exceed the U.N. resolution, acting as though impervious to the objections of other U.N. members. 15 That Kremlin objections to the Iraq War were not heeded was expected; less understandable was the U.S.-led plan to enlarge NATO right up to Russia's borders. From the Kremlin's perspective, by ignoring the concerns of the other permanent U.N. Security Council members, American leaders appeared to be resolved in transforming the global security system developed after WW II into a hegemonic model with the U.S. as the indispensable nation.
After the inclusion of the Baltic countries into NATO in March 2004, Russian officials continued to ask, somewhat rhetorically, "against whom was NATO planning to defend?" An ominous sign that the geopolitical climate within the Kremlin was changing occurred after the September 2004 terrorist attack in Beslan, North Ossetia (sometimes referred to as "Russia's 9-11"). Pro-Chechen fighters seized an elementary school in Beslan, demanding the removal of Russian military forces from Chechnya. Visiting the town once the fighting had stopped (330 killed, about half of whom were children), Putin suggested that perhaps foreign security agencies had played a hand in the tragedy. 16 Russia would need strong security forces to handle both the domestic and foreign threats.
The From the Kremlin's perspective, "democracy promotion" was merely a façade for the spread of greater American geopolitical influence. Putin would need to tailor his security forces to meet this new kind of threat.
As relations began to chill with the West, the Kremlin began to push back with more than just rhetoric. Three events from 2007 reflect this more assertive strategy. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, President Putin claimed that the U.S. had abused its role as global leader, disregarding the legitimate interests of other countries, and "overstepping its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations."
17 These stronger verbal protests soon transformed into action. Next, in April 2007 ethnic Russian protesters took to the streets of the Estonian capital, Tallinn, after city officials decided to relocate a Soviet war memorial. These protests were followed by other forms of intimidation, which included a massive cyber-attack against Estonia's digital infrastructure. Although never proven conclusively, subsequent forensic evidence pointed to Kremlin-sponsored hackers. 18 The Kremlin would continue to develop its cyber and information capabilities to defend its perceived national interests in the post-Soviet space. 19 Finally, U.S. plans to install a missile defense system in Europe to protect against a possible missile strike from Iran, were interpreted by the Kremlin as an attempt by the U.S. to possibly weaken Russia's strategic retaliatory capability. Negotiations in 2007-08 to include some level of Russian expertise into this system proved unsuccessful. In December 2007, after years of diplomatic haggling, the Kremlin announced it would no longer abide by the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, claiming that the treaty no longer served Russia's security interests and signaling that it was less willing to engage in mutual discussions with its Western counterparts over European security. 20 The notion that Russia could be integrated into western security structures was becoming ever more remote. The prevailing attitude among military planners might be best summed up by the quote that has been attributed to Tsar Alexander III: "Russia has only two allies-her army and navy." Relations between Russia and the West continued to deteriorate after Kosovo declared independence in February 2008, which was soon recognized by most Western countries. Russia's traditional ally, Serbia, had appealed to the Kremlin for support in blocking this claim of sovereignty.
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In early April 2008, the Kremlin reacted strongly against the U.S. when it lobbied for a NATO membership plan for Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest Summit. Nor did Kremlin officials appreciate the high-level visit by President Bush to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart in Kiev that same week. One month later, during the Victory Day celebration in Moscow, the Kremlin again sent a strong message, when for the first time in 20 years it decided to include its latest military equipment in the Red Square parade. This display of military prowess was likely designed to not only mobilize greater public support but to also remind Western leaders that Russia was prepared to use force to defend its interests.
During Putin's second tour as president (2004-08) the Kremlin sponsored a significant increase in media programming dealing with the Russian military and other security services. Besides the creation of a dedicated television and media conglomerate within the Ministry of Defense (Zvezda television-radio network), the Kremlin has helped to fund a number of military programs within the other major television networks. 22 Alongside informing viewers of the latest positive developments within the Russian military, these programs have helped to raise overall defense consciousness among viewers. As mentioned earlier, Putin clearly understood the importance of harnessing Russia's information space in defending the Kremlin's interests.
This focus on increased military programming was just a small component of a much larger plan to gain control and direct Russia's information space. During Putin's first two terms as president, nearly all of the major TV, radio and newspaper outlets were placed under indirect Kremlin control. The most important sector has been television, where upwards of 90% of Russians still get some portion of their news. 23 In gaining influence over the major media, the Kremlin has shown an extraordinary ability to exploit or "weaponize" information to secure its hold on power and consolidate public support. Their mastery of this skill was soon on full display in the Caucasus.
Tensions had continued to escalate between Russia and Georgia (new U.S. ally) throughout the summer of 2008, leading to open hostilities in August. From the Kremlin's perspective, even though Russian military forces had experienced some difficulty in routing the Georgian forces, this brief conflict demonstrated that Russia would no longer be pushed around, particularly in its traditional sphere of influence. Under the new placeholder president, Dmitry Medvedev, the Kremlin continued to insist that it would not accept a U.S.-led global order, and that it reserved the right to protect Russian interests in what it termed the "near-abroad." 24 Such protection would demand modern and combat-ready forces. The Kremlin announced a number of significant military reforms following the conflict, mostly designed to improve responsiveness and C2.
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The U.S. plan to "reset" relations with Russia after the conflict in Georgia was likely interpreted by the Kremlin to counteract their more aggressive foreign policy or as an attempt to marginalize or weaken Putin's position as prime minister. By fostering greater cooperation with the more liberal elite under Medvedev, the U.S. could steer Russia toward a less confrontational path (while still pursuing its geo-political goals). The reset, however, was doomed to fail, as it was based on the false assumption that Putin was no longer in control. Despite warmer diplomatic rhetoric during Medvedev's presidency, the Kremlin (under Putin) remained determined to change the post-Cold War global security order.
Russia's resistance to perceived American hegemony was also reflected in major military exercises in 2009 directed against a nominal Western enemy. 26 Despite earlier talk of rapprochement, where Russia would work with NATO and the U.S. in combatting common threats, the Kremlin began to openly plan to defend against Western aggression. Continued U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Europe riled Kremlin leaders, who insisted that this system was directed against them. Although Russia and the U.S. were able to hammer out a new strategic nuclear weapons treaty (New START) in April 2010, it was clear to the Kremlin that Washington and Brussels were still reluctant to accept Russia as an equal power. Strengthening Russia's military capabilities grew increasingly important, and therefore Russia began to place greater importance on improving its military capabilities.
Midway through Medvedev's presidency the Kremlin began to unleash a virulent information campaign that portrayed the West, and the U.S. in particular, in an extremely negative light. In its jaundiced portrayal, the U.S./West was becoming the source of every global ailment. For instance, unrest stemming from the Arab Spring was blamed on U.S. geopolitical meddling, where, under the guise of democracy promotion, the Americans were stoking unrest to strengthen their position on the global chessboard. Even Russian weather reports were open to manipulation. During the summer heat wave in Central Moscow in 2010, one popular explanation was the U.S. use of climate weapons against Russia. 27 With its sway over the national media, the Kremlin was able to shape a frightening and convincing narrative to serve its political goals.
Kremlin proposals in 2009-10, under the "liberal" Medvedev government, to restructure the European security system were ignored or ridiculed by the U.S. and NATO. 28 In the fall of 2011, the Kremlin grew indignant when, after supporting a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, certain NATO countries exceeded this mandate to remove the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. Here again was bloody evidence that the U.S.-led Western order believed that it could act with impunity. From Putin's perspective (or at least from the Kremlin's 24/7 propaganda machine), only robust and modern armed forces could stop the U.S. and NATO from using the same superior military force against Russia.
Relations became more strained in September 2011 after Putin announced his intention to return to the presidency. Following the December 2011 Duma elections (where the pro-Kremlin party won an overwhelming majority of seats), relatively large demonstrations took place in Moscow and other cities protesting alleged election fraud and Putin's automatic claim to the presidency. Putin and the Kremlin's media machine quickly identified the West/US as the instigator behind these protests and the antiAmerican rhetoric was ratcheted up. 29 More and more, Russian defense officials began to talk about the need to defend against the bacillus of color revolutions.
One of Putin's key platforms before returning to the presidency in May 2012 dealt with modernizing Russia's Armed Forces. He pledged to invest some 23 trillion rubles ($770 bn) "over the next decade to purchase more than 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, more than 600 combat aircraft, dozens of submarines and other navy vessels and thousands of armored vehicles." 30 While some of this additional military spending was designed to attract the support of Russians working within the defense industry, part of it also stemmed from the growing belief that military strength would be the key component in defining the country's future. It was not long before the Kremlin found the opportunity to test this hypothesis.
MInIstErs of dEfEnsE undEr PutIn
Another way of tracking Putin's evolving view toward the military is by examining the four individuals who have served as minister of defense since he has been president. Under the Russian constitution, the president is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, whereas the Defense Minister is the nominal head of the military, exercising day-to-day operations, administrative, and operational authority over the armed forces. While not independent, the Defense Minister had inherited considerable authority (and control over financial flows) from the Soviet period, and in rebuilding the military, Putin would need to establish firm control over the Defense Ministry and its budget allocations.
His
Many interpreted Ivanov's appointment as an attempt by the Kremlin to subordinate the military to quasi-civilian control. During the Soviet period the military had assumed a disproportionate role within the government, economy, and society, and by appointing a former KGB officer to the top position, Putin made clear who would direct the military. Prior to Ivanov's appointment, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) had enjoyed equal access to the president on matters dealing with military operations. This changed under Ivanov, as the CGS was formally subordinated to the Defense Minister. Ivanov remained minister of defense for almost six years, helping to correct many of the problems that had developed during the previous two decades. He was somewhat successful in reducing the size of the bloated military structure and constructing the institutional groundwork for future reforms. However, when he left the Defense Ministry, serious problems remained, particularly in the realm of military appropriations, budget accountability, and morale.
Ivanov's replacement in February 2007 was a surprise to most within the military. Anatoliy Serdyukov, who had served as the Kremlin's chief tax inspector, had minimal military or security experience, and was perhaps best known for his aggressive investigation during the trial of Russia's most famous imprisoned oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Some Russian commentators suggested that this appointment signaled that the Kremlin was serious about cracking down on one of Russia's most pernicious problems within the military-corruption. Serdyukov began his tenure by reducing the excess number of staff officers and gaining control over the flow of budgetary funds, particularly within weapons' procurement. Not surprisingly, these reforms were unwelcomed by many senior military officials. However, as Russia's first genuine civilian defense minister, Serdyukov enjoyed considerable presidential support in carrying out these unpopular reforms. Using Serdyukov as a hatchet, the Kremlin was able to enact painful changes, while avoiding direct criticism from the military. From a sheer economic perspective, Serdyukov helped to reduce inefficiency and established greater control over the military budget.
It was under Serdyukov that Russia began one of the most substantial military reforms over the past century. After the brief conflict with Georgia in August 2008, the Kremlin leadership had concluded that Russian interests could only be protected with modern, well-trained military forces. The fighting had revealed a number of shortcomings within Russia's armed forces, especially with effective communication and overall coordination. Under Serdyukov's reforms, the overall organizational structure of the military was streamlined. To improve readiness, mobilization units were eliminated and replaced with smaller, combat-ready brigades. Many senior military personnel spoke out against these radical reforms, claiming that the "new look" military merely mimicked reforms in the U.S. and would weaken Russia's overall defense posture. 31 A few aspects of the reform plan were later modified, but the major structural changes were implemented. The Kremlin leadership continued to deflect criticism of the reforms and direct it toward the ever more unpopular Serdyukov.
Prior to Putin's return as president in May 2012 (although, in reality, he had never left), he had announced a massive plan to modernize the country's Armed Forces. More than 20 trillion rubles would be allocated to improve the country's defense industrial infrastructure and to rearm the military. A new struggle began among some of those close to Putin over control of these revenue flows. The Kremlin had been under growing pressure by many within the military to replace the unpopular Defense Minister. When details of the rearmament plans were released, fierce media attacks began against Serdyukov and his associates, claiming they were guilty of fraud and other indiscretions (the Kremlin-controlled media could also be used to tarnish domestic targets). Ironically, as one who had been appointed as Defense Minister to clean up corruption, Serdyukov was relieved in November 2012 for corruption-related charges and replaced by Sergey Shoygu.
Shoygu's appointment as defense minister indicates the Kremlin's continued high priority for military modernization. Shoygu had built a reputation as an effective manager, having served as Emergency Affairs Minister for nearly 20 years. In this capacity, Shoygu was often found on the front lines, directing rescue efforts when any disaster occurred. He developed a responsive C2 system that enabled the Emergency Ministry to respond quickly and effectively. He has brought this same sense of energy and purpose to the Ministry of Defense. Among other initiatives as defense minister, Shoygu has focused thus far on creating responsive military units and an equally strong C2 system. With his hands-on, commonsense leadership, Shoygu has helped to raise the status, prestige, and morale of the Russian armed forces. While not as popular as Putin, Shoygu is held in high regard by most in the military (as well as among the larger Russian population). Corruption still remains a serious problem, but the Russian military today, under the combined leadership of Putin and Shoygu, has become more effective.
currEnt statE of russIan MIlItary
A military often reflects the strengths and the weaknesses of the country it purports to defend. While the country still faces serious problems, over the past 18 years Russia has made many material and social improvements, and these advances are replicated within its Armed Forces and other security agencies. First and foremost, the soldier as defender of the Russian state has been returned to a revered pedestal. The Kremlin has been able to largely transform the discredited image of the Russian soldier, which had developed after the collapse of the USSR, into the proud and professional "polite man." 32 Underpinning this pedestal, there have been substantial improvements with the military's infrastructure and equipment, manpower, and overall organization.
Overall living conditions for military personnel have improved since the latest round of reforms began in 2008. Officer and contractor pay is largely competitive with other government agencies. Living conditions for one-year draftees (e.g., barracks, food, uniforms, etc.) have become much better. The waiting list for adequate housing for military officers has finally shrunk to manageable levels. Discipline within the ranks has improved, and there are far fewer reported cases of hazing. 33 The military continues to develop a nascent non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps to provide training expertise, discipline, and continuity within the contract and draftee ranks.
There have been similar improvements in the realm of military equipment and training facilities. Significant funding has been allocated toward modernizing everything from the soldier's basic kit to advanced weapon systems. Russia is in the midst of developing modern combined arms training facilities where military personnel can test the latest tactics and equipment in a realistic training environment. 34 The confusion after the 2008 reform of the military's education system (where nearly 75% of the military schools were closed or consolidated) has subsided, and the reorganization has resulted in greater efficiency and less redundancy.
Over the past decade, Russian officials have worked hard to improve the image of serving in the armed forces. The term of conscription has been reduced to one year and defense officials have implemented a series of reforms to both improve soldier living conditions and allow soldiers to focus on military tasks. The Kremlin has recently enacted legislation that provides incentives for some young Russian men to fulfill their military obligation while enrolled in college. Select students will gain credit for military service by working on projects related to the country's defense industry. 35 Legislation has also been introduced whereby future government service and the right to travel abroad are contingent upon completing some form of military service. 36 Theoretically, this legislation should reduce draft evasion.
Even with these improvements, however, defense officials still struggle to attract a sufficient number of soldiers as one-year draftees or to enter contract service. Demographic challenges combined with a general reluctance to join the armed forces have stymied plans to staff the military with around one million personnel (220,000 officers, 425,000 contract personnel, and 350,000 draftees). The draft contingent today would have been conceived during the economically-stressed period of the late 1990s. Not only is the potential draft pool considerably smaller, but, according to some reports, is a significant percentage also simply unfit for military duty due to health problems and criminal records.
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There are also questions as to the combat readiness and technical expertise of a draftee manning system. One year is hardly long enough to become fully proficient in even the most basic soldier skills, and the constant turnover of personnel weakens combat readiness. Earlier, defense officials claimed that conscript soldiers would not be deployed into combat zones, but there is evidence that draftees fought in both Georgia and Ukraine. 38 Some have suggested that the one-year draft is primarily designed to raise patriotic awareness and to create a large mobilization reserve in the event of major hostilities. 39 Defense officials also envision those who have completed their one-year draftee service as the primary pool for contract soldiers.
Similarly, there have been considerable problems attracting sufficient qualified contract soldiers within the Russian military.
40 From its inception in the 1990s, the program has been poorly managed and funded. Up until quite recently, many contract soldiers were the wives of officers. As the administrative promises sometimes did not correspond with reality, those who signed contracts often left the military when contract provisions were unmet. 41 To date, the infrastructure to support contract personnel (e.g., family housing) remains insufficient. Questions also remain regarding long-term career progression for contract soldiers and retirement benefits.
42 Even though there have been significant improvements in prestige, pay, and living conditions for those who serve in the armed forces, defense officials will still struggle with attracting a sufficient number of young Russians to serve as contract soldiers in the military.
According to Kremlin reports, as the prestige, living conditions, and salary for military officer personnel have improved over the past few years, so has recruitment and retention. The reality appears to be less sanguine. While there has been an increase in applications to attend military officer schooling, many of those who graduate prefer to serve in the reserves and not on active duty. The officer promotion and assignment system remains somewhat arbitrary, where the immediate commander holds inordinate sway over the officers serving in his command.
One of the key reforms enacted after the 2008 conflict with Georgia dealt with transforming the old Soviet mobilization model of manning units to creating some 85 combat-ready brigades. To simplify C2, three intermediate levels of command were mostly eliminated (divisional, corps, and army levels). Part of the justification behind this change was the conviction that the demands of modern war would not allow for a slow, deliberate period of mobilization. The enemy could strike quickly and hard, and unless Russian forces were prepared to fight on a moment's notice, the war might be over by the time mobilization was completed. 43 While exact statistics are classified, given the current manpower challenges, likely only a certain percentage of these brigades are truly combat-ready. 44 Prior to this reform to create combat-ready brigades, Russian military leaders had relied upon their airborne forces as their rapid reaction force. Within the military, Russia's airborne forces are a distinct force and regarded as one of the most elite and powerful weapons in the Kremlin's arsenal. Airborne forces played a key role during both the conflict with Georgia in 2008 and in seizing key installations in Crimea in 2014. As problems have developed with manning and training sufficient draftees to maintain these conventional combat-ready brigades, greater emphasis has now been placed upon airborne or special-forces-type units, which are primarily manned with contract or professional soldiers. These forces would likely serve as the nucleus in any future combat.
Another key reform from 2008 helped to streamline the command and control of the Russian Armed Forces. The previous six military districts were consolidated into four joint-like commands, oriented toward a specific threat.
45 In this new model, parochial interests of the former branches have theoretically been subordinated to an overall command structure, which also incorporates elements of other power ministries. Overall command and control is now exercised by a massive new national military control center in Moscow.
46 On paper at least (and on the virtual screens of the new control center in Moscow), there is much greater unity of effort among the various Russian security forces (e.g., MVD, FSB, Emergency Ministry, etc.).
At the other end of the defense spectrum, there have been continued developments and improvements within Russia's strategic nuclear forces. 47 Russia's nuclear weapon arsenal remains a chief hallmark of its superpower status. Even more disconcerting than Russia's plans to modernize its nuclear arsenal have been the not-so-casual suggestions over the past several years that the Kremlin might launch nuclear weapons to protect its interests. 48 Faced with the perceived conventional superiority of U.S./NATO forces, Russian defense officials have suggested the possible use of nuclear weapons to thwart an attack.
The ongoing conflict in South East (SE) Ukraine has had a profound effect upon both Russian security agencies and the larger population. The massive information campaign depicting this conflict as an attack upon ethnic Russians and a defense against Western-sponsored Ukrainianfascist nationalists elevated patriotic sentiments among a wide portion of the population to feverish levels. In 2014-15, regular Russian military forces played a decisive role in defending the separatist regions in Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukrainian forces. The Russian military has continued to stage elaborate exercises near the Ukrainian border, suggesting that it is prepared to use force again to defend these separatist entities. They have also begun to permanently reposition a significant number of military units and infrastructure near the Ukrainian border to defend against this threat. While perhaps not fully conventional, the fighting in SE Ukraine has helped to hone the Russian ground forces tactical and logistic skills. The conflict has also been an opportunity to test new weapons and equipment under combat conditions.
Despite the Kremlin's claims to the contrary, these military achievements have come at high cost. The overall image of Russia has suffered since this conflict began. Russia has lost its membership in the G8 and Western imposed economic sanctions have restricted capital investment within key industries. Only a handful of minor countries have recognized Russia's annexation of Crimea and few within the international community believe that Russia has not been directly involved in the ongoing violence in SE Ukraine. Although a majority of Russians believe that their military or the separatist forces were not responsible for shooting down Malaysian Airlines flight 17 in July 2014, the evidence and many in the West point to Kremlin culpability. Similarly, the conflict in Ukraine may have boosted the reputation of the Russian military domestically; internationally, however, their involvement has prompted alarm and increased calls for effective defensive measures among its Western neighbors.
The Kremlin's insistence that regular Russian military forces have not been directly involved in this conflict has also confounded the military's manpower challenge. Military officials have repeatedly claimed that conscript soldiers would not be sent into combat operations (relying instead upon contract soldiers). Despite these claims, there have been reports that Russian conscripts might have been involved in the Ukrainian conflict. Parents of young Russian men, who clearly remember the horrors and deception of the Kremlin in the Chechen Wars, are likely taking additional measures to ensure that their sons avoid military service. Already Russian military officials have resorted to secrecy and intimidation to silence the grieving families who have lost soldiers in this conflict.
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Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict since September 2015 has also been a mixed blessing for the military. On the plus side, the Russian armed forces have demonstrated the ability to effectively project force into a distant military theater. The media has portrayed Russia's involvement as "proof" that the country is back up off its knees, and is now a force to be reckoned with. This conflict has provided the military with the opportunity to employ and test advanced weapon systems, particularly air and naval assets. However, while there have been minimal casualties so far, there are growing concerns that Russia's support for the Assad regime might not only escalate, but could result in serious "blowback." Moreover, the Kremlin's hope that their contribution to the fight against international terrorism in Syria would lead to Western sanction relief has yet to be realized.
Indeed, Russia's military support of the Assad regime has led to a potentially dangerous conflict with the U.S. and Turkey. For instance, in November 2015, Turkey and Russia almost came to blows when Turkish forces downed a Russian Su-24 military aircraft after it crossed into Turkish airspace. The Kremlin was incensed when an American Navy fighter jet downed a Syrian Su-22 fighter in June 2017. The problem stemmed from competing objectives and different perspectives over which forces should be labeled as "terrorist." While all three countries have focused on the removal of Islamic State (IS) militants from Syria, now that IS forces have nearly been defeated, fundamental differences have emerged as to what a post-IS Syria will resemble. Given its role over the past two years and its continued military presence in the country, the Kremlin will play a key role if and when a post-Assad government is formed.
In gauging the strength of Russia's military today, one other point bears mention. Just as in other areas of society, the Kremlin-supported media have played a prominent role in transforming the poor image of the Russian military of the 1990s into the professional, proud and presumably combat-ready force of today. Virtually, the Russian military has become a force that not only commands respect but causes greater trepidation among its neighbors. There remain questions, however, to what degree this image corresponds to reality, especially with regard to logistics, manpower and advanced technology. In this regard, one might recall the comment made by Putin in 2002 (who was quoting Churchill): "Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be."
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PutIn's futurE MIlItary Plans
Given the nature of the current Russian political system and the inherent fickleness of human nature, making any firm prediction regarding the Kremlin's future military plans is nearly impossible. Theoretically, a weakened Russian economy would hamper plans to modernize the military, which, in turn, might make the Kremlin leadership more risk averse. Such a theory, however, bears little resemblance to reality. Though confronting serious economic challenges due to a fall in fossil fuel prices and Western sanctions, the Kremlin leadership remains intent upon continued military modernization. Their calculus appears to be predicated upon the belief that greater military power will ultimately translate into greater geopolitical and economic influence.
Should fossil fuel revenues remain at a low level and Western sanctions stay in place, the Russian economy would likely fall into a serious recession. To reiterate, there are serious doubts as to whether a profound economic downturn would weaken the Kremlin leadership and/or ameliorate Russian foreign policy approaches, particularly in those regions that the Kremlin considers its traditional area of interest. Reduced oil prices and Western-imposed economic sanctions have had little effect in altering the Kremlin's aggressive behavior toward Ukraine or its willingness to become more involved militarily in the Middle East.
While Russian economic growth has declined over the past two and a half years, the Kremlin leadership has proven adept both at opening new markets and blaming the West for its economic failures. In the Kremlin's rendition, these sanctions are part of a nefarious Western plan to weaken Russia and prevent the country from restoring its greatness. Anti-American and anti-Ukrainian sentiments remain at dangerous levels. Despite the current economic hardship, Putin enjoys extremely high domestic approval ratings, and this support could be channeled into further aggression against Ukraine or other regions where the Kremlin perceives it has legitimate security interests.
Realpolitik considerations will also help to shape Putin's future military plans. He apparently sincerely believes that a multi-polar system of global governance is superior to a unipolar model. Many within the Kremlin leadership maintain that U.S. global supremacy stems largely from its military prowess. To both defend its interests and to serve as a counter-pole to the U.S., Russia must develop an equally qualified and combat-ready military.
The continued conflict in SE Ukraine also serves to support and justify the Kremlin's anti-Western narrative and continued military modernization. According to the Kremlin's narrative, the U.S./West stage-managed the forceful change of government in Kiev in order to gain a staging ground from which it can attack and weaken Russia. From the Kremlin's perspective, the conflict in SE Ukraine has less to do with the fate of those ethnic Russians living under separatist control in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, than with the very survival of the Russian state. If the Kremlin were to back down and allow Ukraine to independently pursue a pro-European course, this perceived weakness could be exploited, both by extreme Russian nationalists or those interested in genuine political reform. Despite the growth of an equally virulent Ukrainian nationalism, which depicts Russia as the greatest threat, Putin continues to refer to Ukraine as an integral part of the Russian world. 51 To retreat or return to the status quo could fatally damage the very legitimacy of Putin's regime.
The conflict with Ukraine has revealed a number of other important aspects as to how the Kremlin might employ force in the future. For years Russian military theorists have been arguing that there are a number of preliminary coercion measures that should be employed before using military power. These entail everything from information operations to diplomatic and economic pressure, from the employment of local proxy forces to co-opting cultural, religious, and business leaders. In their description of future conflict, espionage, targeted assassinations and other indirect methods of suasion are used against the target country before the possible introduction of regular military forces.
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The logic of the Kremlin's current predicament points toward continued attempts to increase Russian influence within the regions of the former USSR. Soft power will likely remain the preferred strategy behind this expansion, but the overt or covert use of military or harder forms of power cannot be ruled out. As a nuclear superpower, the Kremlin leadership understands that its geo-political rivals are reluctant to directly confront Russia's irredentist claims. As such, the plans to reform and modernize Russia's Armed Forces, across the military spectrum, from conventional to nuclear, will remain a high Kremlin priority. Foreign economic pressures could delay these efforts, but Russia retains a relatively strong military-industrial base, where research and development of new weapon systems has increased over the past decade. Moreover, in those areas where Russian companies have been unable to develop their own modern military technology, Russian security managers have proven skillful at procuring key components via other means.
conclusIon
In the Kremlin's narrative, Vladimir Putin has strengthened the Russian state over the past 18 years. After the chaos and humiliation of the 1990s, he has worked to lift Russia off its knees to stand strong as a global power. The country's economy and the material well-being of a majority of Russians have improved significantly. There have been similar improvements within Russia's Armed Forces. The image of the demoralized, poorly equipped and defeated soldier of the mid-1990s has been replaced by the patriotic, professional, and combat-ready warrior of today.
These improvements have, however, come at a cost. In constructing and consolidating this strong Russian state, the Kremlin leadership has restricted a number of civic freedoms. Russia today lacks genuine political opposition, media freedom, and truly independent courts. Most major business interests are closely tied to the Kremlin. Many of the seedlings of civil society that developed during the 1990s have been suppressed. Russia's foreign policy has also changed direction since Putin's return to the Kremlin in 2012. The pro-Western orientation of the 1990s and his first two terms as president has been replaced with a Eurasian vec-tor where a militarily powerful, conservative Russia has become the counterweight to the liberal West.
A critical component of the Kremlin's consolidation of power has been the development and propagation of a dangerous nationalist ideology, which posits that the West/US is determined to weaken Russia. Playing upon the resentment and humiliation of the 1990s, the Kremlin-supported media juggernaut has convinced the majority of Russians that the West/ US/NATO present a dire threat. To protect Russia from this danger, the country needs a modern, highly trained, and well-equipped military.
The effects of this perilous ideology have been on display in Ukraine over the past three years, where Russia's fraternal neighbor has been transformed into a dangerous enemy. Today, a significant percentage of the Russian population believes that they have an obligation to defend their ethnic brethren in Eastern Ukraine from the predations of the proWestern government in Kiev.
The Kremlin leadership has thus constructed a governance model and ideology largely predicated upon defending ethnic Russians, regardless of national borders. The extent to which this ideology is realized could depend, to a significant degree, on the continued modernization of its Armed Forces.
NOTES
6. The problems with command and control stemmed from the hasty decision to commit Russian military forces to crush the separatist movement and the general confusion within the shrinking, demoralized Russian military. Indeed, the initial ground commander for this operation (General Eduard Vorobiev) elected to resign from the military rather than lead untrained troops into combat. There were also serious problems coordinating efforts of Russia's other security services (e.g. MVD, FSB etc.) with that of the General Staff. Finally, many Chechens had no desire to separate from Russia and could not be labeled as "enemy," though they were often treated as such. 7. The late 1990s were a particularly difficult period for Russia as the country's transition to democracy and a market economy were thwarted by institutional weakness and monumental corruption. Yeltsin went through five different prime ministers from March 1998 until Putin's appointment in August 1999. These painful memories have been exploited by the current Kremlin leadership as "proof" that the West was determined to weaken Russia by attempting to impose its form of government. For a brief summary of this time period, see Stephen Wegren, ed., Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, Sixth Edition, (Rowman and Littlefield, NY, 2015).
8.
In an attempt to demonstrate their displeasure at NATO's aggression against Serbia, Russian forces moved to seize the main airport in Kosovo. The history surrounding the brief seizure of the airport in Pristina by Russian peacekeepers in June 1999 has now been rewritten to illustrate that the West/US will only take Russian interests into consideration if these interests are backed by the threat of military retaliation. For background on this incident, see: "Confrontation over Pristina airport," BBC News, March 9, 2000, accessed May 29, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/671495.stm.
9. The 1994-96 phase of the Chechen War ended not with a bang but with an illdefined political agreement, which postponed the determination of Chechnya's political status for five years. One of Yeltsin's campaign promises during the closely contested 1996 presidential campaign had been to end the war in Chechnya. After winning the election in June, Yeltsin appointed Russian General A. Lebed to hammer out a ceasefire agreement with the rebel Chechen leadership. While Russian forces pulled out of Chechnya, the war-torn region hardly prospered, falling instead into internecine criminality. 
